the statute contemplates a cause of action against someone who engages in
retaliatory discrimination against a purely social acquaintance in a purely social
capacity, even if the discriminator otherwise happens to be an employer. This does
not help ESD 171, however, because a refusal to hire is unquestionably an action
taken by an employer in its capacity as such.
Likewise, it may be reasonable to infer that because RCW 49.60.210(1)
makes retaliation an unfair practice of"any employer, employment agency,[or]
labor union," the "other person[s]" mentioned as possible defendants might be
restricted to entities that are functionally similar to employers, employment
agencies, or labor unions. See Malo,92 Wn. App. at 930. This is not necessarily
true, as the Court of Appeals has held that it is an unfair practice for a credit union
to expel a member because he assisted credit union employees in an
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Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9
antidiscrimination lawsuit, persuasively reasoning that a credit union is an '"other
person'" for purposes ofRCW 49.60.210(1). Galbraith v. TAPCO Credit Union,
88 Wn. App. 939, 951, 946 P.2d 1242(1997). We need not decide that issue
today, however, because ESD 171 is most certainly an employer.
Thus, there are likely some limitations to RCW 49.60.210(l)'s application,
but none are relevant here, and the statutory structure and context do not indicate
any legislative intent to limit its prohibition on retaliatory discrimination to
discrimination within existing employment relationships. Notably, RCW
49.60.210(1) explicitly applies to employment agencies, whose very purpose is to