ESD 171 argues that RCW 49.60.210(l)'s reference to "any employer"
should be read as "the plaintiffs current employer." Because it is undisputed that
ESD 171 was not Zhu's current employer when it refused to hire him,ESD 171
thus argues that RCW 49.60.210(1) cannot apply as a matter oflaw. We disagree.
For purposes of WLAD,an "employer" is broadly defined as "any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or
more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not
organized for private profit." RCW 49.60.040(11). This definition clearly
includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates
that "any employer" means something different for purposes ofthe antiretaliation
statute than it does for the purposes ofthe rest of WLAD. See Champion v.
Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304(1972)(we assume
that when the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory
scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout).
First, ESD 171 correctly notes that RCW 49.60.210(1) does not explicitly
refer to prospective employers or job applicants. However,this is not a distinctive
11
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Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9
feature of the antiretaliation provision because none of WLAD's provisions refer to
a "prospective employer" or a "job applicant." Exactly one provision in WLAD
refers to a "prospective employee," RCW 49.60.030(3), but none ofthe other
provisions that clearly apply to them do so. For instance, RCW 49.60.180 provides
in relevant part:
It is an unfair practice for any employer.