give effect to the legislature's intent, we begin with the statute's plain language.^
Dep't ofEcology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4(2002).
When interpreting WLAD,we are particularly mindful that "a plaintiff bringing a
discrimination case in Washington assumes the role of a private attorney general,
vindicating a policy of the highest priority." Marquis v. City ofSpokane, 130
Wn.2d 97, 109, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). To further this important purpose, both the
legislature and Washington courts require that even in a plain language analysis,
WLAD's provisions must be given "liberal construction." Id. at 108 (citing RCW
49.60.020).
1. The ordinary meaning ofthe plain language of RCW 49.60.210(1)
shows that the answer is yes
The plain language of RCW 49.60.210(1), in and of itself, strongly indicates
that the answer to the certified question is yes. That statute provides that it is an
unfair practice for "any employer ...[to] discriminate against any person because
he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter." Therefore, if
(1)ESD 171 is an employer,(2)Zhu is a person,(3)refusal to hire is
^ ESD 171 contends that a plain meaning analysis is inappropriate because the district
court already ruled that RCW 49.60.210(1) is ambiguous. See N. Centr. Educ. Serv. Dist., 2016
WL 7428204, at *11. However, our review is de novo and we may answer certified questions of
state statutory interpretation based on the statutes' plain language without finding any ambiguity.
E.g., Lopez Demetrio v. Sakuma Bros. Farms, Inc., 183 Wn.2d 649, 656, 355 P.3d 258 (2015).
8
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Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9