Finally, discriminating against a person in "terms or conditions of
employment" because of race is clearly a practice forbidden by WLAD,and filing
a lawsuit for damages based on such discrimination is clearly opposing that
practice. RCW 49.60.180(3). Therefore, Zhu's prior lawsuit against Waterville
for racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment constituted
opposition to a practice forbidden by WLAD.
Thus, all the elements of RCW 49.60.210(1) are met: An employer, ESD
171, discriminated against a person, Zhu, by refusing to hire him, and the jury
determined that it did so because Zhu opposed practices forbidden by WLAD by
suing Waterville for racial discrimination.
ESD 171, however, argues that the overall statutory context shows that the
legislature intended WLAD's antiretaliation provision to be significantly narrower
than WLAD's provisions prohibiting discrimination based on protected
characteristics, such that the antiretaliation provision applies only to a plaintiffs
current employer and prohibits only adverse actions that affect the plaintiffs
preexisting employment status. ESD 171 is correct that discerning a statute's plain
meaning requires us to consult the statute itself, "as well as related statutes or other
provisions ofthe same act in which the provision is found." Campbell & Gwinn,
10
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9
LLC, 146 Wn.2d at 10. However,ESD ITl's interpretation is entirely inconsistent
with the plain language, structure, and purpose of WLAD as a whole. We
accordingly reject it.
2. As in the rest of WLAD,an "employer" is not limited to the plaintiffs
current employer for purposes of RCW 49.60.210(1)