definition of an "employer," and RCW 49.60.210(1) explicitly applies to "any
employer." There is nothing in the statutory language or context to indicate that
RCW 49.60.210(1) does not mean exactly what it says.
3. RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits all forms of discrimination by employers
in their capacity as employers
ESD 171 also takes the position that RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits retaliatory
discrimination only in the context of an established employment relationship
because the only forms of prohibited retaliation that the statute explicitly mentions
are "discharg[ing]" and "expel[ling]," both of which contemplate a preexisting
relationship. While the list of prohibited retaliatory actions in RCW 49.60.210(1)
is explicitly not exclusive, ESD 171 is correct to the extent that specific statutory
terms may reasonably inform courts as to the meaning of broader statutory terms.
RCW 49.60.210(1)(it is an unfair practice for an employer "to discharge, expel, or
otherwise discriminate'''(emphasis added)); Champion, 81 Wn.2d at 674.
13
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Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9
However,ESD 171's proposed interpretation ofRCW 49.60.210(1) is an
unreasonable application of that general rule.
Certainly, there are some reasonable inferences we might draw from the
explicitly listed forms of prohibited retaliatory discrimination. For instance,
because RCW 49.60.210(1) explicitly prohibits employers "discharg[ing or]
expel[ling]" a person on a retaliatory basis, it might well be reasonable to infer that
its prohibition against employers "otherwise discriminat[ing]" is limited to actions
that employers undertake in their capacity as employers. It does seem unlikely that