At first glance, § 52-122 appears to conflict with Practice Book §§ 116, 133 and 169. Practice Book § 116, in particular, provides that “[i]n any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff’ (emphasis added), and § 169 provides that withdrawal of an action after an equitable counterclaim is filed shall not impair the defendant’s right to prosecute the counterclaim. Section 52-122 provides, however, only that the listed statutes “shall not affect” proceedings in summary process. The summary process statute, General Statutes §§ 47a-23 through 47a-42, does not itself expressly prohibit the court from ruling on equitable and legal issues in the context of a summary process action, and, indeed, § 47a-39, entitled “Court may grant stay of execution,” contemplates that the court will undertake a traditionally equitable consideration of the defendant’s need for a stay. It is well established that the summary process statute provides landlords with an expedited eviction process that is in derogation of the common law action in ejectment; Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973); and as such, shall be narrowly construed. Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). Given the broad scope of authority now vested in the Superior Court housing session by the enactment of No. 78-379 of the 1978 Public Acts, including the authority to decide “[a]ll actions for . . . other relief arising out of the parties’relationship as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant”; General Statutes § 47a-68 (h); and to decide cases related to the same landlord-tenant relationship that have been brought in other courts upon their transfer to the housing docket; General Statutes § 47a-70 (b); we decline to read the summary process statute to prohibit consideration, in a single action, of equitable issues relating to a summary process action brought to the housing docket.