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INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973)

Citation
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973)
Parent Document
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973)
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date
1973-03-05

Other Sections in This Document (181)

Full Text

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During the past century this court has continued to construe agreements for the rental of dwelling units according to historic and traditional common law concepts of property law, including the firmly imbedded rule of caveat emptor. It has continued to do so even in the face of statutes such as St. 1907, c. 550, § 127, applicable only in Boston, providing that: “Every structure and part thereof and appurtenant thereto shall be main*209tained in such repair as not to be dangerous. The owner shall be responsible for the maintenance of all buildings and structures. The lessee under a recorded lease shall be deemed the owner under the provisions of this act.” In commenting on this statute in Palmigiani v. D’Argenio, 234 Mass. 434, 436, involving a tenancy at will, this court said: “It is plain that there is no express repeal of the rule at common law relating to contracts creating a tenancy at will, under which no liability is imposed on the landowner for obvious defects, or for want of repair, unless he contracts to keep the premises in a safe condition, and to make suitable repairs during the tenancy. . . . The statute not having attempted to regulate or modify the.contractual relations of the parties it should not be broadened, or a construction adopted by implication which would materially limit the rights of parties to enter into such lawful contracts as they please. It would be going far to say that the Legislature intended to do away with fundamental law.” Speaking of the same statute in Vallen v. Cullen, 238 Mass. 145, 147-148, the court said that it “does not in express terms attempt to modify or affect in any way the relations between landlord and tenant as they exist at common law.” For other cases to the same effect and involving the same statute, though different sections thereof, see Borden v. Hirsh, 249 Mass. 205, 210, Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 566, and Heilbronner v. Scahill, 303 Mass. 336, 337-338. To the same effect, but involving other statutes, see Garland v. Stetson, 292 Mass. 95,100-103, involving regulations on elevators under authority of G. L. c. 143, §§ 68-69, and Richmond v. Warren Inst. for Sav. 307 Mass. 483, 485, involving G. L. c. 143, § 23, prohibiting the obstruction of stairways.2