Section 1950
- Citation
- Section 1950
- Parent Document
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1995-03-06
Other Sections in This Document (169)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
- Section 1950
Full Text
829 chars*752 Plaintiffs contend the 25 percent limitation on attorney fees was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to obtain and consider evidence regarding the number of hours class counsel devoted to the litigation, counsel's normal hourly rates, counsel's experience, or the quality of the legal services provided. This contention is premature because it is impossible to determine whether attorney fees in the amount of 25 percent of the "aggregate class recovery" are adequate, given that (1) the amount of defendants' offsets, if any, have not yet been calculated, and it is therefore impossible to determine what the total class recovery will be, if anything, and (2) this case is far from over, and it is therefore impossible to determine the total number of hours class counsel will devote to it prior to completion.