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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 1950

Citation
Section 1950
Parent Document
Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
1995-03-06

Other Sections in This Document (169)

Full Text

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*748 When enacting, interpreting, or applying a rule of law that regulates the interaction between individual citizens, the lawmaking body should consider carefully before creating absolute and invariable rules. Normally, such laws should be as flexible as the regulated interactions are varied, and they should leave the courts with some discretion to apply them justly given the facts of the case before them. (See Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 917, 920 [“In promulgating any kind of law, one of the tasks a lawmaker must perform is to select the best formulation of that law—the one that delegates to the law administrator the level of discretion and authority that is just right.”].) Without some degree of flexibility, harsh and improper results may occur. (See id. at p. 937, fii. omitted [Comparing strict rules, like statutes of limitations, to more flexible standards, like the doctrine of laches, and asserting that as lawmakers move toward more rigid rules, “there is an increasing potential for incorrect judgments—judgments that would not reflect the lawmaker’s preferences had the lawmaker adjudicated the case personally on an all-things-considered basis .... The rigidity of rules creates errors. [¶] . . . [A] rulelike statute of limitations will always be both underinclusive and overinclusive .... [and therefore] [i]t will never be a perfect reflection of its underlying policies.”].) Such flexibility is particularly appropriate when applying equitable doctrines, such as setoff. (See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946) 327 U.S. 392, 396 [90 L.Ed. 743, 747, 66 S.Ct. 582, 162 A.L.R. 719] [“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.”].)