Section 1950
- Citation
- Section 1950
- Parent Document
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1995-03-06
Other Sections in This Document (169)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
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Full Text
1,109 charsPlaintiffs requested that judgment be entered on behalf of the entire class for the aggregate amount of the security deposits retained, and suggested that any amounts not ultimately claimed by individual class members should escheat to the state. The trial court rejected the request and entered judgment in favor of only those members of the class (excluding the named plaintiffs, whose claims were dealt with separately) who might actually come forward and file individual claims. In doing so, the court issued a memorandum of intended decision stating in pertinent part: “In certain consumer class actions Fluid Recovery may be the best method of compensating the class. The propriety of Fluid Recovery in a particular case depends upon its usefulness in fulfilling the purposes of the underlying cause of action. (See State v. Levi Strauss & Co. [1986] 41 Cal.3d 460 [224 Cal.Rptr. 605, 715 P.2d 564].) We do not find that the Fluid Recovery method is necessary to fulfill the purposes of this case.”7 Plaintiffs now contend that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the remedy they requested.