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lost his home notwithstanding Eshagian’s failure to comply with
the three-day notice requirements, and for us to deny review
would “make it so landlords are the only parties who . . . may
obtain summary relief despite not complying with the conditions
for such relief, and can deprive the opposing party of judicial
review by not seeking or waiving damages that are ancillary to
the action.” We agree that there must be a path for tenants to
expeditiously challenge a possession-only judgment given the
high stakes—the tenant’s ability to remain in the premises. And
Cepeda is correct that the limitations on an appeal are one-
sided—the landlord has the ability promptly to appeal a
judgment for the tenant because a final judgment will be entered
if the tenant prevails on the unlawful detainer complaint. The
ability of a tenant to file a petition for writ of mandate evens out
the playing field, but given the posture of this case, we must
decide whether to treat Cepeda’s purported appeal as a petition
for writ of mandate. Under the unusual circumstances here, we
grant Cepeda’s request to do so.
As we explained in Curtis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
pages 465 to 466, the Supreme Court in Olson v. Cory (1983)
35 Cal.3d 390, 401 (Olson) “considered five factors in holding it
was appropriate to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ:
Whether ‘(1) requiring the parties to wait for a final judgment
might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings; (2) the briefs and
record included, in substance, the necessary elements for a
proceeding for a writ of mandate; (3) there was no indication the
trial court would appear as a party in a writ proceeding; (4) the
appealability of the order was not clear; and (5) the parties urged
the court to decide the issues rather than dismiss the appeal.’”
Applying these factors, the court in Olson concluded there were