Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)

Citation: Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)
Parent Document: Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2025-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10617811/eshagian-v-cepeda/ ↗

Full Text

1,207 chars

15
       Moreover, most remedies available to a defendant to
challenge entry of a default judgment in the trial court are not
available to a tenant in an unlawful detainer action because the
challenged possession-only judgment is not a final judgment. For
example, a defaulted defendant generally may challenge entry of
the default judgment based on the sufficiency of the complaint by
filing a motion to vacate a nonjury “judgment or decree” under
section 663, subdivision (1), where there is an “[i]ncorrect or
erroneous legal basis for the decision.” 6 However, as the
Supreme Court in Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124, 127
explained, section 663 “allows an aggrieved party in a civil case to
move the trial court to vacate its final judgment.” (Italics added.)
In clarifying that the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
under section 663 is an appealable order, the court in Ryan
explained that those orders “fit [the] description” of orders
appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), which allows
an appeal of “‘an order made after a[n appealable] judgment.’”
(Ryan, at p. 127.) Because a possession-only judgment is not an
appealable judgment, a motion to vacate a possession-only

Other Sections in This Document (49)

Full Text