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specifies that after the defendant defaults, “[t]he case shall
proceed as an unlawful detainer proceeding,” as long as the
complaint has not been amended or set aside, even if possession
is no longer at issue. (See Civ. Code, § 1952.3, subds. (a) & (c).)
The plain language of these code sections makes clear that an
unlawful detainer proceeding continues following the defendant’s
default if the plaintiff seeks damages, even after possession has
been restored to the plaintiff. Accordingly, we cannot say the
judgment “‘“‘terminates the litigation between the parties and
leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined.’”’” (Dana Point, at p. 5.)
Cepeda’s alternative contention that the possession-only
judgment was appealable under the collateral order exception to
the one-final-judgment rule fares no better. In some
circumstances, “[c]ourts have also treated collateral orders as
appealable, holding that ‘“[w]here the trial court’s ruling on a
collateral issue ‘is substantially the same as a final judgment in
an independent proceeding’ [citation], in that it leaves the court
no further action to take on ‘a matter which . . . is severable from
the general subject of the litigation’ [citation], an appeal will lie
from that collateral order even though other matters in the case
remain to be determined.”’” (Curtis v. Superior Court (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 453, 464 (Curtis); accord, In re Marriage of
Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 418.)
Cepeda argues the award of damages “is not a ‘necessary
step’ to determine the issue of possession and is, therefore,
collateral,” citing Park v. Law Offices of Tracey Buck-Walsh
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 179, 188 (trial court order requiring
plaintiff to pay third party Department of Justice for production
of electronically stored documents was appealable because it was