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appellate division, if the possession-only judgment was not
appealable, to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.
In its September 18, 2024 published opinion, the appellate
division held the possession-only judgment was appealable. The
appellate division recognized that Eshagian’s damages claims
were still pending in the trial court, but it found “[u]nder the
unique circumstances of this case, the default judgment entered
by the court was a final, appealable judgment.”
Turning to the merits, the appellate division concluded the
three-day notice was deficient because it failed to identify when
the notice period commenced, did not give the address where the
rent payment should be sent (instead listing Cepeda’s unit
number), and did not make clear that Eshagian would demand
possession of the premises if the rent was not paid within the
prescribed time. Therefore, the complaint, which incorporated
the three-day notice, did not state a cause of action. The
appellate division reversed the judgment and dismissed the
appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate.
On October 9, 2024, on our own motion, we transferred the
case to this court in order to secure uniformity of decision and to
settle important questions of law with respect to the
appealability of a possession-only judgment entered in an
unlawful detainer action. (§ 911; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1002.) After the parties filed their briefs on appeal, we
requested supplemental briefing addressing whether the
possession-only judgment is appealable. 6
DISCUSSION