Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)

Citation: Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)
Parent Document: Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2025-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10617811/eshagian-v-cepeda/ ↗

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       A defaulted tenant will generally be able to show there is
no adequate remedy at law to challenge a possession-only
judgment (in addition to a likely showing of irreparable harm if
the tenant is facing eviction). That is because “a party who is in
default is barred from further participation in the proceedings,”
including raising a challenge at the default prove-up hearing.
(Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333,
343 (Siry); accord, Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 887
[where defendant had not shown that default was improperly
entered, “[t]he entry of default bars [defendant] from advancing
contentions on the merits”]; Steven M. Garber & Associates v.
Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 823 [“Procedurally, the
entry of a default . . . cuts off the right [of a defendant] to file
pleadings and motions, and the right to notices and the service of
pleadings.”].)
       Thus, a defaulted tenant has no ability to appear in the
trial court to request the setting of a trial date on a landlord’s
damages claims. It would be unfair to allow a landlord to obtain
a possession-only judgment and shield the judgment from review
by never requesting a determination of the landlord’s damages
claims. 5

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