Akassy v. William Penn Apartments Ltd. Partnership, 891 A.2d 291 (2006)

Citation: Akassy v. William Penn Apartments Ltd. Partnership, 891 A.2d 291 (2006)
Parent Document: Akassy v. William Penn Apartments Ltd. Partnership, 891 A.2d 291 (2006)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2006-02-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2167433/akassy-v-william-penn-apartment... ↗

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William Penn Apartments Limited Partnership (the landlord), appellee/cross-ap-pellant, filed a complaint for possession of real property against appellant/cross-ap-pellee, Hugues Denver Akassy (the tenant), based upon the tenant’s failure to pay rent. The court entered a default judgment against the tenant when he failed to appear for the scheduled hearing. Before any eviction could take place, the parties agreed to the entry of a consent order under the terms of which the default judgment remained in effect with its execution stayed conditioned upon the tenant’s payment of past due rent and court costs by a date certain and compliance with a “pay-on-time” provision for one year. Before that year ended, the landlord notified the tenant of a rent increase, but the tenant tendered payment in the former amount and subsequently filed a tenant-petition challenging the rental increase with the District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). The trial court (Judge Blackburne-Rigsby) granted the landlord’s motion to vacate the stay, and the tenant appealed from that order. Thereafter, the trial court (Judge Gregory Mize) granted the tenant’s motion for a stay of the writ of eviction pending appeal, and the landlord appeals from that order. The tenant’s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in setting aside the stay based on the alleged breach of the “pay-on-time” provision of the consent order where the tenant refused to pay a contested rent increase implemented after the consent order was entered and challenged its legality administratively. He also contends that the trial court improperly permitted unilateral modification of the agreement, miscon *296

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