LLC, [hereinafter "Deland"] which effectuated the actual moving of Respondent's
belongings on March 25, 2025." (NYSCEF Doc. 48, at ¶12). Petitioner cites to
CPLR §1001(a) which provides that a necessary party is one "who ought to be [a
party] if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the
action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action." (NYSCEF
Doc. 48, at ¶ 13). This argument is without merit.
Deland and Marshal Schain are agents of Petitioner acting at Petitioner's disposal.
Petitioner contracted Marshal Schain to complete a
full
eviction, at Petitioner's instruction, and Deland to store Respondent's personal
property. (emphasis added). Neither one of those proposed necessary parties have the
responsibility to store, post-eviction, the property for a reasonable period of time, or a
minimum of 30 days; Petitioner, however, does. (Caldwell v. 928 Gerard Ave.
Partners, supra, at 860, citing Wilson v. CRL Mgt., Inc., 14 Misc 3d 231, 232-233
[Rochester City Ct. 2006]). Put simply, the Court made no mention of Marshal Schain or
Deland in the May Decision. (NYSCEF Doc. 33). The May Decision only imposes the
responsibility on Petitioner to restore Respondent's personal property in its entirety to the
subject premises. The notion that complete relief cannot be afforded on this order to
show cause without nonparties who acted at Petitioner's behest is misguided. Marshal
Schain and Deland are not necessary parties to this motion as neither their past conduct,
nor future actions, can undermine a judgment of contempt. (Brodsky v. Selden
Sanitary Corp., 78 AD2d 866, 866-67 [2nd Dept. 1980]).
Contempt Finding, Damages, and Legal Fees
It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to provide an affirmation/affidavit of anyone