Law (hereinafter "PHL") §157(1) as they did not file a notice of claim prior to the
motion for civil contempt. According to Petitioner, Respondent had an obligation to first
give notice of its potential claim for civil contempt prior to moving for such relief.
(NYSCEF Doc. 48, at ¶¶¶ 7, 10, 23). This interpretation of the law is
specious at best as Petitioner attempts to equate Respondent's motion for contempt to a
tort claim. (Id.). This is not a claim sounding in tort. It is an allegation that
Petitioner failed to comply with a clear and unequivocal order.
The Court, however, agrees that PHL §157 is a condition precedent to a cause
of action against the Housing Authority. (Matter of Felder v City of New York, 53 AD3d 401, 862
N.Y.S.2d 36 [1st Dept. 2008]; J & E Industries of Ossining, Inc. v Peekskill
Housing Authority, 128 AD3d 638, 8 N.Y.S.3d 394 [2d Dept 2015]). Although true,
the purpose of a notice of claim is to "permit a municipal defendant to investigate the
validity of a claim and determine whether it desires to pay or settle the claim without the
expense of litigation." (Minott v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.-Fort Indep. Houses, 83
Misc 3d 1204(A) [Civ. Ct.]). Here, no such confirmation of validity is needed or
required. The parties are already in litigation as Petitioner affirmatively [*4]commenced a summary proceeding against Respondent
Ingram alleging nonpayment of rent, which ultimately resulted in her eviction on default;
an eviction that this Court already determined did not comply with RPAPL §749(3)
as Petitioner executed its warrant against an unnamed adult occupant despite only having
a possessory judgment against Respondent. (NYSCEF Doc. 33). To extend Petitioner the