courtesy of an investigatory period as a precursor to avoiding litigation would essentially
award its failure to comply with the law.
This Court instead finds Respondent's argument compelling in that Petitioner should
not have the opportunity to fashion its own remedy or alternatively ignore Respondent's
claim because, in the context of civil contempt, it is not for the contemnor to determine
the potential damages. (NYSCEF Doc. 49, at ¶ 40). The appropriate resolution in
this context is to either to purge civil contempt or appeal the finding that a party defied a
court order. (Peters v. Sage Group Assoc., 238 AD2d 123, 123 [2d Dep't 1997];
Midlarsky v. D'Urso, 133 AD2d 616, 617 [2nd Dept. 1987]; In re
Hildreth, 28 AD2d 290, 293 [1st Dept. 1967] [Courts retains a large degree of
discretion to forge an appropriate punishment for civil contempt and as to conditions on
which contempt may be purged]). Even if Petitioner had a "good-faith belief that the
order was defective [it] is no reason to disregard it unilaterally."(Peters v Sage Group
Assoc., 238 AD2d at 123; see Bell v White, 55 AD3d 1211, 1215, 867 NYS2d 729
[2008]). As such, Respondent has not violated PHL §157(1).
Judiciary Law §756 Notice Requirements
Petitioner further argues that Respondent Ingram failed to comply with the notice
requirements of Judiciary Law §756, which provides that,
"The application shall be noticed, heard and determined in accordance with
the procedure for a motion on notice in an action in such court, provided, however, that,
except as provided in section fifty-two hundred fifty of the civil practice law and rules
or unless otherwise ordered by the court, the
moving papers shall be served no less than ten and no more than thirty days before the