time at which the application is noticed to be heard." (emphasis added).
Petitioner is correct that the Court afforded them less than 10
days from the date it signed Respondent's order to show cause to the date the motion was
noticed to be heard.[FN3]
Be that as it may, through a plain reading of the statute, it is clear that the Court had
every authority to do so. (See Judiciary Law §756).
It is axiomatic that the starting point in any case of statutory interpretation must
always be the language itself, giving effect to every word therein to the extent possible.
(Matter of Mestecky v. City of NY, 30 NY3d 239, 243 [2017]; Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler,
18 NY3d 48, 56 [2011]; Matter of Sedacca v. Mangano, 18 NY3d 609, 615 [2012]
[In matters of statutory interpretation, legislative intent is the "great and controlling
principle"]). Here, Respondent's argument regarding statutory interpretation is
compelling. Use of the phrase "or unless otherwise ordered by
the court" highlights that the drafters of Judiciary Law §756 intended to
create an exception regarding the timing of service for motions under this statute.
(emphasis added). Thus, there is no violation of Judiciary Law §756 when the Court
orders the return date [*5]of a motion for contempt less
than 10 days from the date the order to show cause is signed. (Matter of Michael D. [Tiffany
D.], 30 Misc 3d 502, 512, [Fam. Ct.]).
Further, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the timeline of the motion as the Court
adjourned the proceeding to provide them with an opportunity to submit
opposition/responsive papers. (NYSCEF Doc. 47).
Necessary Parties
Petitioner finally argues that Respondent "failed to name necessary parties such as
Marshal Schain and the moving company, Deland Moving & Storage Logistics