Per the explicit direction of Congress, then, unless Kessler by prohibiting FDCPA warnings in RPAPL 1304 notices affords consumers greater protection than that afforded by the FDCPA, the FDCPA is controlling and Kessler may not here be applied. (See 15 USC § 1692n.) In this court's estimate, Kessler affords consumers less protection, not more. Kessler deprives the recipients of section 1304 90-day notices of warnings and/or information{**76 Misc 3d at 743} which Congress and courts interpreting the FDCPA deem meaningful and important. Conversely, as this court pointed out in its prior interim order, the Kessler majority was unable to articulate how its "bright-line" rule advances the purposes of the New York State Legislature in enacting section 1304's "separate envelope" requirement: "[T]he Kessler majority was unable to discern the Legislature's intent: the purpose of the 'separate envelope' is nowhere stated in its decision, and the majority is forced at one point to guess that it may have been 'to obviate a borrower becoming confused or distracted by extraneous information.' " (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Luria, 75 Misc 3d 1205[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50384[U], *6; see Kessler, 202 AD3d at 18.) The notion that New York can avoid the FDCPA by asserting that it affords consumers only "extraneous information" that distracts them from the state-dictated contents of a section 1304 90-day notice may not be countenanced.