"The mini-Miranda disclosure requirement carves out a special exception, however, for 'a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.' Id. Here, Congress attributes to the debtor the common sense to know that when a creditor sues him, the creditor wants to collect the debt, and that what the debtor tells the creditor can be used in the collection case." (Bohannon, 2015 WL 893362, *4, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 24976, *10-11; see also Rivas v Pollack & Rosen, P.A., 2019 WL 6468709, *4, 2019 US Dist LEXIS 207460, *11 [SD Fla, Dec. 2, 2019, Case No. 19-cv-61815-BLOOM/Valle] [citing Bohannon, and observing that the "formal pleading" exception applies to a variety of litigation-related documents once a lawsuit to collect the debt has been initiated].)
The court in U.S. Bank N.A. v Sackaris (74 Misc 3d 923 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2022], supra), having cited Bohannon, Rivas{**76 Misc 3d at 736} and similar cases, incongruously found that pre-litigation section 1304 90-day notices qualify as "formal pleadings," and accordingly held that there was no inconsistency between the FDCPA and RPAPL 1304 as construed by Kessler.[*9](See id. at 925-926.) The case law on which the Sackaris court founded its decision is simply inapropos: those cases dealt not with pre-litigation notices but exclusively with documents tantamount to complaints in civil actions (or, as noted, post-commencement filings in civil actions).