However, the Second Circuit's decision in Romea v Heiberger & Assoc. (163 F3d 111 [2d Cir 1998]) demonstrates precisely why section 1304 90-day notices are not "formal [*10]pleadings" in a foreclosure action. The question therein presented was whether the three-day notice required by RPAPL 711 as a statutory predicate for an article 7 summary eviction proceeding[FN5] is exempt from FDCPA requirements on the grounds that it constitutes "legal process" within the meaning of 15 USC § 1692a (6) (D). The Romea court answered "no," and its analysis bears directly on the resolution of the issue presented here. The court held:
"Under New York law . . . a § 711 notice is a prerequisite to, rather than a part of, an Article 7 proceeding. 'The three-day notice is not a pleading; rather, it is a notice to the tenant of what must be{**76 Misc 3d at 738} done to forestall a summary proceeding.' J.D. Realty Assoc. v. Jorrin, 166 Misc.2d 175, 179 . . . aff'd sub nom. J.D. Realty Assoc. v. Scoullar, 169 Misc.2d 292, 293 . . . (N.Y.Sup.App.Term 1996) . . . Article 7 expressly provides that a summary proceeding is 'commenced by petition and a notice of petition.' N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 731(1) . . . [Defendant] offers us no basis for interpreting the definition of 'legal process' under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D) to include notices that are a prerequisite to, rather than part of, a legal proceeding." (Romea, 163 F3d at 117 [emphasis added].)