In other words, the FDCPA affords debtors protection even from inadvertent misrepresentations (1) that money is due when in fact on account of bankruptcy it is not, and (2) that recovery is sought from the debtor personally when in fact on account of bankruptcy it is not. To extend this protection to defendant Luria as well as to protect itself from liability under the FDCPA, Nationstar properly qualified its section 1304 90-day notice with a bankruptcy advisory, to wit: "However, if you are currently in bankruptcy or have received a discharge in bankruptcy, [*12]this communication is not an attempt to collect a debt from you personally to the extent that it is included in your bankruptcy or has been discharged, but is provided for informational purposes only." Once again, this court concludes that to the extent that Kessler and its progeny prohibit the inclusion of an FDCPA bankruptcy advisory in a section 1304 90-day notice, the rule promulgated by those cases is inconsistent with the provisions of the FDCPA.
Federal Preemption of Kessler and its Progeny by the FDCPA
15 USC § 1692n provides:
"This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter" (emphasis added).