In Arellano v Clark County Collection Serv., LLC (875 F3d 1213 [9th Cir 2017]), the Ninth Circuit elucidated "conflict" preemption principles in the context of the FDCPA. The court wrote:{**76 Misc 3d at 741}
" '[S]tate law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.' [English v General Elec. Co., 496 US 72] at 79 . . . This conflict occurs when 'the operation of state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," ' In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 . . . (1974)), or when it 'interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal,' Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 . . . (1987). In other words, state law is preempted when 'under the circumstances of the particular case,' it stands as an obstacle to Congressional purpose '—whether that "obstacle" goes by the name of "conflicting; contrary to; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; interference," or the like.' Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 . . . (2000) . . . (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 . . . (1941)).
"Federalism requires that we assume federal law was not intended to supersede the states' historic police powers 'unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, [573 US 1] . . . (2014). Although we read even express preemption provisions narrowly, a state cannot avoid compliance with a federal regime 'merely by relying upon a connection to an area of traditional state regulation.' Wos v. E. M. A., 568 U.S. 627, 640 . . . (2013).