The Court finds Judge Tomasi’s reasoning in 37 Perry Street, LLC, persuasive in ways that go
beyond the limited scope of what a “written lease” constitutes under Section 4467. From its
elements, it is evident that a periodic tenancy differs from a written lease in several ways. First, there
is no writing to memorialize the agreement of the parties and show a meeting of the minds as well as
an express willingness to be bound by the terms outside of the original lease term. Second, the
periodic tenancy arises by implication and common law through the subsequent actions of the
parties. Tenant stays in the dwelling unit and continues to pay the rent. Landlord accepts the rent
and does not move to end the tenant’s possession. Third, the periodic tenancy has qualities
strikingly similar to equitable estoppel in that a party who carries forward as if the tenancy has
continued cannot later disclaim those terms on which the other party has acted in reliance. See In re
Griffin, 2006 VT 75, ¶ 18 (describing the standards for equitable estoppel). Therefore, the Court
concludes that under the concept of a periodic tenancy, there is no written contract for purposes of
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24-CV-04906 Glenn Mack et al v. June Morel et al
the statute of frauds. 12 V.S.A. § 181(2). By extension, the Court finds that there was no written
agreement in this case after April 30, 2024 to bind Defendant Callahan as guarantor to the terms of
the original lease.