Haddad v. Francis, 537 A.2d 174 (1986)

Citation: Haddad v. Francis, 537 A.2d 174 (1986)
Parent Document: Haddad v. Francis, 537 A.2d 174 (1986)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1986-06-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3346009/haddad-v-francis/ ↗

Full Text

766 chars

The defendant argues that PJR, Inc., as the assignee of himself and Colucci, must be regarded as the tenant for two reasons. First, because the dissolution by forfeiture did not terminate the lease. And, second, because PJR, Inc., although dissolved, can still be sued in its corporate name. It is true that the dissolution of a corporation lessee, before the expiration of the term, does not constitute an automatic breach or termination in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the lease. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 360, 362. It is also true that “[a]ny action or proceeding by or against a dissolved corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name . . . .” General Statutes § 33-378 (e); Don Rich Corporation v. Rossini,

Other Sections in This Document (65)

Full Text