Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-10-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10136084/milford-redevelopment-housing-... ↗

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The defendant responds that the lack of evidence pre-
          sented at trial to suggest that she continued violating
          the no-smoking policy supports the court’s judgment
          in her favor. We agree with the plaintiff.
             The following legal principles are relevant to our
          resolution of this claim. ‘‘The plenary standard of review
          applies to the preliminary issue of whether the court
          applied the correct legal standard in evaluating [a defen-
          dant’s] special defense.’’ Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, 193
          Conn. App. 137, 150, 219 A.3d 400 (2019), aff’d, 337
          Conn. 228, 253 A.3d 1 (2020). ‘‘The burden of establish-
          ing an equitable defense in a summary process action
          falls on the party asserting that defense.’’ Id., 151.
             As set forth in part II A of this opinion, the defendant
          did not plead as a special defense that she cured the
          violation. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had
          pleaded as a special defense that she cured the viola-
          tion, the court nevertheless improperly placed the bur-
          den of proof on the plaintiff by requiring the plaintiff
          to prove that a subsequent violation of the no-smoking
          policy had occurred after it issued the pretermination
          notice. The court’s memorandum of decision provides
          that ‘‘the plaintiff claimed multiple violations of the
          no-smoking policy as the basis of its claim of a lease
          violation. The evidence presented at trial, however, only
          established violations prior to the pretermination
          notice. . . . The plaintiff did not present evidence of
          violations after the sending of the letter.’’ (Emphasis
          added.) This statement is an improper application of our
          jurisprudence on special defenses. Had the defendant
          raised as a special defense that she cured the violation,
          then she, and not the plaintiff, would have borne the
          burden of proving that defense. See O & G Industries,
          Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 204 Conn. App.
          614, 625, 254 A.3d 955 (2021) (‘‘defendant must prove
          the allegations in its special defenses by a fair prepon-
          derance of the evidence in a civil trial’’). Accordingly,
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