Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-10-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10136084/milford-redevelopment-housing-... ↗

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initiated this summary process action against the defen-
dant claiming that the defendant repeatedly violated
the plaintiff’s smoke-free housing policy. In rendering
judgment for the defendant, the trial court rejected the
plaintiff’s claim on the basis that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the defendant had not cured the violation
of the plaintiff’s policy. On appeal, the plaintiff raises
interrelated claims. First, it claims that the court
improperly raised sua sponte the unpleaded special
defense of cure to defeat its summary process action.
Second, it claims that, even if it was proper for the
court to raise the special defense of cure sua sponte,
the court improperly placed the burden on the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant did not cure her violations.
The defendant, in addition to disputing the plaintiff’s
claims, argues that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the action because of alleged inadequa-
cies in the pretermination notice1 provided to the defen-
dant. For the reasons that follow, we reject the defen-
dant’s jurisdictional argument and agree with the
plaintiff that the court improperly rendered judgment
in favor of the defendant.2 Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the court.
1
Federal regulations refer to the notice as a ‘‘termination notice.’’ See 24
C.F.R. § 274.4 (2021). We, however, ‘‘use the term ‘pretermination [notice]’
in this opinion to reflect the fact that the federal notice precedes a notice
to quit, which is the sole mechanism to terminate a tenancy under Connecti-
cut law.’’ Presidential Village, LLC v. Perkins, 332 Conn. 45, 47 n.1, 209
A.3d 616 (2019). Both the plaintiff and the defendant also have used the
term ‘‘pretermination notice’’ throughout the trial and appellate court pro-
ceedings.
2
The defendant also contends, as an alternative ground for affirming the
judgment of the trial court, that the plaintiff waived its right to evict the
defendant by renewing her lease in the intervening time between the issuance
of the pretermination notice and the service of the notice to quit. We decline
to review the defendant’s proposed alternative ground for affirming the
judgment because the record is inadequate for review. First, although the
defendant raised as a special defense that the plaintiff ‘‘accepted rent or
otherwise waived the Notice to Quit after I received it,’’ the trial court did
not address this special defense. ‘‘It is well known that [o]nly in [the] most
exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider [an alternative
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