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Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-10-15

Other Sections in This Document (60)

Full Text

2,475 chars
Furthermore, the statutory time requirement set forth
          in 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (k) (2) and (l), on which the defen-
          dant relies, applies to the period of time within which
          the defendant must have an opportunity for a hearing
          before an impartial party—not to the time for initiation
          of the grievance process. As the defendant acknowl-
          edges in her appellate brief, such a hearing only occurs
          if the issue leading to the pretermination notice is not
          resolved earlier in the grievance process during infor-
          mal negotiations. Significantly, although § 1437d (k)
          provides a number of rights a tenant has in connection
          with such a formal hearing, it does not require that any
          of those rights be included in the pretermination notice.
            The required contents of the pretermination notice
          are instead established by the regulations. Title 24 of
          the 2021 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations,
          § 247.4 (a), provides: ‘‘The landlord’s determination to
          terminate the tenancy shall be in writing and shall: (1)
          State that the tenancy is terminated on a date specified
          therein; (2) state the reasons for the landlord’s action
          with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to
          prepare a defense; (3) advise the tenant that if he or
          she remains in the leased unit on the date specified
          for termination, the landlord may seek to enforce the
          termination only by bringing a judicial action, at which
          time the tenant may present a defense; and (4) be served
          on the tenant in the manner prescribed by paragraph
          (b) of this section.’’ Nothing therein requires the preter-
          mination notice to identify timelines related to initiating
          the grievance procedure.
            Additionally, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3) (ii) provides
          that ‘‘[t]he notice of lease termination to the tenant
          shall state specific grounds for termination, and shall
          inform the tenant of the tenant’s right to make such
          reply as the tenant may wish. The notice shall also
          inform the tenant of the right (pursuant to § 966.4 (m))
          to examine PHA documents directly relevant to the
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