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Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-10-15

Other Sections in This Document (60)

Full Text

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an administrative grievance hearing to challenge the
         proposed termination of her lease.’’ (Footnotes added.)
         On June 28, 2023, this court denied the defendant’s
         motion to dismiss without prejudice to the parties
         addressing the jurisdictional issue raised by the defen-
         dant in their appellate briefs. Additional facts will be
         set forth as necessary.
                                                I
           As a preliminary matter, we address whether the trial
         court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
         summary process action. The defendant argues that the
         court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
         pretermination notice sent to her was inadequate in
         two respects. First, she argues that the pretermination
         notice was defective in that it failed to provide the
         proper time frame for her to initiate the grievance pro-
         cess. Second, she argues that it ‘‘fail[ed] to provide . . .
         sufficient factual information for [the defendant] to
         defend against the claimed violation of [the no-smoking
         policy].’’ We reject the defendant’s claims that the pre-
         termination notice was insufficient and, therefore, con-
         clude that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over
         the summary process action.
           The following legal principles are relevant to our
         resolution of this claim. ‘‘A motion to dismiss . . .
           7
              Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1437d (l), provides in relevant part:
         ‘‘Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . .
            ‘‘(4) require the public housing agency to give adequate written notice of
         termination of the lease which shall not be less than—
            ‘‘(A) a reasonable period of time, but not to exceed 30 days—(i) if the
         health or safety of other tenants, public housing agency employees, or
         persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises is threatened; or
         (ii) in the event of any drug-related or violent criminal activity or any felony
         conviction;
            ‘‘(B) 14 days in the case of nonpayment of rent; and
            ‘‘(C) 30 days in any other case, except that if a State or local law provides
         for a shorter period of time, such shorter period shall apply . . . .’’
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