Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)

Citation: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Parent Document: Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-10-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10136084/milford-redevelopment-housing-... ↗

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day period to invoke the grievance process rather than
          the thirty day period to which she claims she is entitled
          pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (k) (2) and (l).10 The
          defendant’s claim rests on a flawed premise. Section
          1437d (k) does not mandate that the amount of time
          afforded a tenant to invoke the grievance process must
          be identified in the pretermination notice. Rather, it
          sets forth the substantive requirements of what pro-
          cesses must be afforded to the tenant before eviction.
             In support of her construction, the defendant relies
          on Housing Authority v. Love, 375 Ill. App. 3d 508,
          509–10, 874 N.E.2d 893 (2007), in which the Appellate
          Court of Illinois considered whether a PHA’s grievance
          procedure, which required that any grievance be made
          within ten days after the grievable event, violated 42
          U.S.C. § 1437d (k) (2). In that case, the PHA ‘‘served
          upon [the tenant] a 30-day notice of termination of the
          lease’’ on September 13, 2006, and the tenant ‘‘hand-
          delivered a grievance to [the PHA], contesting the termi-
          nation of the lease’’ on September 27, 2006. Id., 509.
          Because ‘‘the deadline for submitting a grievance was
          September 23, 2006,’’ the PHA considered the grievance
          untimely and never responded to it. Id. In the ensuing
          eviction action, the tenant moved for judgment in her
          favor ‘‘on the ground that [the PHA] had failed to pro-
          vide her the grievance procedure required by federal
          law. [The tenant] argued that under the applicable fed-
          eral statute, her grievance was timely because she sub-
          mitted it within the 30-day period in the notice of termi-
          nation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d (k) (2), (l) (4) (C) (2000).
          The [trial] court disagreed with [the tenant’s] interpreta-
          tion of the statute and held the grievance to be untimely
          because [she] had failed to submit it within 10 days,
            10
              In resolving the defendant’s claim, our inquiry is limited to whether
          the pretermination notice is jurisdictionally defective in this respect. The
          question of whether the grievance procedure, as established and imple-
          mented by the plaintiff, complies with federal law is not before this court.
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