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window to pay the rent after notice that it was once again “due.” It was only after passage of
these four days that Kruger would have been in a position to initiate unlawful detainer
proceedings by service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit.
As there was no failure by Appellants to timely pay rent due under the lease, there was
no default in payment of rent at the time the three-day notice was served, rendering the notice
void as a matter of law. Moreover, Appellants were entitled under the lease to the passage of
four days after the lease was reinstated and rent once again became “due” before Kruger could
serve a three-day notice, which further supports the invalidity of the notice here. (WDT-
Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 [because notice was defective, it is
insufficient to support judgment for unlawful detainer].) Because the three-day notice was
premature as a matter of law, Kruger did not meet the technical requirements of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2). We accordingly reverse the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellants are prevailing parties entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.891(a)(2).)