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default continues after the three day notice period has elapsed. (Davidson v. Quinn (1982) 138
Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 11.)
“ „ “The failure of the tenant to pay rent does not ipso facto work a forfeiture of the
leasehold; it merely gives the lessor the right to terminate the lease in the manner provided by
law… .[Citations.]” ‟ The essential element, therefore, is the notice and whether or not it
comports with the fundamental requirements of the law.” (Davidson v. Quinn, supra, 138
Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 11.)
Here, the notice to pay rent or quit appears to seek rental payments for the six-month
period from April 2013 through September 2013. At trial, Kruger testified she had initiated the
prior action for Appellants‟ illegal use of the property and while that action was pending, she
would not accept rent and returned all rental payments they had deposited for that six-month
period.
We glean from the record that during the period in which the prior action was pending,
Appellants made a series of timely payments for rent, all through direct deposit into Kruger‟s
bank account as agreed by the parties. They paid the April 2013 rent by deposit into Kruger‟s
account on April 1, 2013. Kruger testified she retained and did not return the April 1, 2013 rent,
even though the prior action was then pending. Appellants paid the May 2013 rent by deposit
into Kruger‟s account on April 30, 2013. Kruger testified she returned this deposit “in cash” but
could not remember the date she did so and thought it might have been on a date before the May
rent was even paid. She had no receipts or records to support this testimony. Appellants paid
the June 2013 rent by deposit into Kruger‟s account on May 17, 2013. Kruger testified she
returned this deposit through her attorney by check sometime after May 22, 2013. Appellants
denied having received either the cash return, or the May 22nd check (that was never cashed),
suggesting that the funds for the April 1, May 1, and June 1, 2013 rent payments remain in
Kruger‟s account or otherwise in her possession or control. Appellants then paid $8,400 as
advance rent for the months of July, August, and September 2013, by deposit into Kruger‟s
account on June 20, 2013. On June 21, 2013, Kruger returned this advance payment of rent by
check payable to Appellants‟ counsel on June 21, 2013. Kruger testified she then considered