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day under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2). Moreover, under the lease,
she could not serve a three-day notice until “after the rent continue[d] to be unpaid after four
days after the date it is due.”4 If, as Kruger suggests, the notice itself informed Appellants that
rent was again “due,” then they were entitled to four days after such notice—not three—before
Kruger could initiate eviction proceedings. They fully paid again any rent “due” within this
four-day period, i.e., by September 13, 2013, but Kruger refused to accept it.
Kruger relies on Occidental Real Estate v. Gantner and Mattern (1908) 7 Cal.App. 727
and Webb v. Jones (1927) 88 Cal.App. 20 (Webb), for the proposition that a landlord is entitled
to serve a three-day notice after having previously rejected tendered rental payments, and that
the tenant must then pay the rent due within the notice period to prevent eviction. But neither of
these cases concern rent actually paid to the landlord by direct deposits made under Civil Code
section 1500. Unlike in Webb, where the court specifically distinguished rent merely tendered
by check that the landlord refused, this record affirmatively demonstrates that Appellants
satisfied Civil Code section 1500 by their timely deposit of rental payments for the six-month
period in Kruger‟s bank account. By their actual payment of rent such that Kruger received and
possessed these funds as her own property, Appellants extinguished their obligation under the
lease to pay rent when due for this period of time—a distinct material fact in this case that
compels a different result.
As noted, we do not suggest that payment of rent through direct deposit would fully
extinguish the obligation to pay rent at all under the lease, if those deposits were returned.
Rather, we conclude Appellants were not in default in payment of rent as of September 9, 2013,
as they had timely deposited the rent due through the month of September and all prior months.
They were not informed that Kruger was changing course and would then accept outstanding
rent for the period for which it had already been not just tendered but paid, though returned. At
a minimum, Kruger was required to provide notice and demand payment of rent due, i.e., that
previously paid by deposit but returned, once she reinstated the lease and became open to
accepting rent payments. She was further obliged under the lease to give Appellants a four-day