According to the trial testimony, the prior action was ultimately dismissed on September
9, 2013. That same day, Kruger served Appellants with the three-day notice to pay rent or quit
in this case. The trial court concluded the lease was reinstated on that date by dismissal of the
prior action. On cross-examination, Kruger admitted that while in her mind, rent was again due
as of September 9, 2013, in the months before that date, she had not accepted any rent from
Appellants and had returned either some or all the advance rent they had paid. But Kruger did
not inform Appellants on or before September 9, 2013 that, as of that day, she considered the
lease to be reinstated and back rent to again be “due,” or that if rent were tendered or paid again
for April through September 2013, she would accept it.
Civil Code section 1500 provides: “An obligation for the payment of money is
extinguished by a due offer of payment, if the amount is immediately deposited in the name of
the creditor, with some bank or savings and loan association within this state, of good repute,
and notice thereof is given to the creditor.” When this section is satisfied, there has been not a
mere tender but actual performance of an obligation to pay money. (Walker v. Houston (1932)
215 Cal.742, 746.) A tender by check is not actual payment within the meaning of the statute,
which requires a deposit in the name of the creditor. (Norton v. Lyon Van & Storage Co. (1935)
9 Cal.App.2d 199, 202.) Under Civil Code section 1500, Appellants‟ deposits of rent directly
into Kruger‟s bank account covering the period April through September 2013, resulted in
satisfaction of their monthly obligation to pay rent by the due dates under the lease for these
months.3 If rent were to again become “due” for this period of time because of reinstatement of
the lease and Kruger‟s willingness to accept rent timely paid but previously returned, then