Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)

Citation: Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)
Parent Document: Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1995-10-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2381535/ayers-v-landow/ ↗

Full Text

1,447 chars

The trial court considered Gantt, but reasoned that the statutory provision, “[i]f the notice is posted on the premises, a copy of the notice shall be mailed ... within 3 calendar days of the date of posting,” meant that the posting must be antecedent to the mailing, an interpretation mandated by the statute’s use of the word “if’. See also majority opinion at 55 (suggesting that the term “then” be read into § 45-1406 in order to create an “if-then” chronology requiring the mailing to be ancillary to posting). The trial court recognized that the Gantt rule fixing termination dates appeared to be compelling precedent, especially in light of the probate statute’s use of the words “within 6 months after.” (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the trial court distinguished Gantt from the present case on its facts, and what the court thought were the possible consequences of applying the Gantt rule to the landlord-tenant relationship. The trial judge concluded that “[t]o adopt the plaintiffs interpretation of this statute could lead to a kind of temporal anarchy” in the landlord-tenant context, depriving tenants of adequate certainty regarding when their exposure to an eviction action would begin. Although the judge conceded that on the merits of the action the landlord had a “powerful case,” he nevertheless entered a judgment for the tenant, ruling that the language of the service statute forbade the landlord’s premature mailing. II.

Other Sections in This Document (158)

Full Text