Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)

Citation: Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)
Parent Document: Ayers v. Landow, 666 A.2d 51 (1995)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1995-10-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2381535/ayers-v-landow/ ↗

Full Text

1,255 chars

The question whether § 45-1406 permits a mailing a substantial period before service by posting is purely one of law. We therefore need not accord the judge’s ruling any deference, and our review is de novo. Guadalupe v. United States, 585 A.2d 1348, 1352 n. 7 (D.C.1991). We have, however, set forth the trial judge’s reasoning in some detail because, in our view, his construction of the statute, which he gave orally from the bench, was both eloquent and persuasive. We agree with the judge that to read the phrase “within three days,” in the present context, as countenancing mailings effected weeks or even months before the posting on which the landlord relies would create “temporal anarchy” and a host of practical problems which the legislature could not have intended. When, for example, would the tenant be required to “cure or quit” if a letter were mailed to him on January 1, and if a notice were tacked to his door half a year later on four different days in July? Moreover, the letter, by itself, is concededly ineffective to achieve service. It is, in effect, a nullity. We do not believe that such a nullity can be retroactively converted, a substantial period after the fact, into one part of a legally sufficient service of the notice.

Other Sections in This Document (158)

Full Text