Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)

Citation: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Parent Document: Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2005-10-13
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1472683/douglas-v-kriegsfeld-corp/ ↗

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One further clarification is in order. The tenant's answer alleging the landlord's failure to afford the tenant "a reasonable accommodation in her housing unit before the institution of this lawsuit" is legally insufficient; as previously noted, the tenant had not requested a reasonable accommodation, and thus had not proffered that basis for discrimination, before the landlord filed suit. On the other hand, the landlord has been aware since at least February 20, 2002 (when counsel for the tenant wrote counsel for the landlord) that the tenant was continuing to seek a reasonable accommodation. Furthermore, the tenant's counterclaim charged discrimination "by seeking possession of the [tenant's] unit through court process and not affording the [tenant] a reasonable accommodation in her housing unit" a claim in the disjunctive that, unlike the answer, does not limit the counterclaim to discrimination during the period before the landlord filed suit. Finally, the landlord has responded to the tenant's answer and counterclaim on the merits, not on the ground that each failed for lack of a proper pleading; the landlord has not alleged any irregularity here. This court has held that, when a plaintiff has ample opportunity to respond to a defense not specified in the answer, the plaintiff cannot claim to have been prejudiced by the defendant's failure to plead a defense in the answer, and thus the defense is properly before the trial court it is not waived despite its omission from the pleadings. Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc., 467 A.2d 468, 472 (D.C.1983); Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999, 1003 (D.C.1980); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C. 1980); Wright v. McCann, 122 A.2d 334, 336 (D.C.1956). Accordingly, the tenant's limitation of her reasonable accommodation defense in her answer to the period before institution of this lawsuit is not fatal; that defect has been amply cured by the parties' litigation of that defense extending through the period until the trial court entered judgment of possession.

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