INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)

Citation
Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Parent Document
Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (2005)
Jurisdiction
DC (municipal)
Effective Date
2005-10-13
Original Source
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1472683/douglas-v-kriegsfeld-corp/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (533)

Full Text

1,855 chars 
After failing for more than three months to respond to the tenant's request for a "reasonable accommodation," the landlord learned at least two weeks before the scheduled trial that the tenant was seeking a brief stay of the eviction proceeding to allow an agency of the D.C. government, APS, to clean the premises. And the landlord learned at the pretrial hearing, if not earlier, that the tenant would not contest eviction if the apartment, once clean, became filthy again. A reasonable jury could find that, given this knowledge, the landlord, nonetheless, did not respond. Here, then, is the point: until a landlord makes a good faith, reasonable effort at accommodation, upon request, after learning of a tenant's mental impairment, the landlord's continued pursuit of a pending action for possession is a discriminatory act under the Fair Housing Act.[32] In this case, however, despite the trial court's initial common-sense observation *1127 that the landlord would be completely protected if it agreed to a brief stay of the eviction proceeding while the District government cleaned the premises, the court did not connect that observation with its analysis of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the Fair Housing Act. More specifically, it did not recognize that before the "health and safety" exception could be invoked, the landlord had a legal duty—upon request—to "open a dialogue" with counsel for a mentally impaired tenant, not merely a practical responsibility to pursue a settlement for the parties' mutual benefit. Accordingly, as a consequence of its belief that the "health and safety" exception could be invoked without concrete findings on the "dialogue" issue, or even on the "tenant cooperation" issue, the court's reliance on that exception to justify the eviction was, in our view, premature and thus an error of law.