Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 845926.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 845926.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/845926.pdf ↗

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Dr. Litvack argues that summary judgment was not appropriate because there

was evidence of competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination

which satisfies the pretext prong.

Our Supreme Court explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the

pretext prong in Scrivener v. Clark College:

An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant’s
reason is pretextual or (2) that although the employer’s stated reason is
legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating
the employer.

An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s
articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case
law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that
discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action,
not the only motivating factor.

181 Wn.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014) (citations omitted).

“Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment

discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.”

Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 528. “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to

show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor

in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 528

(emphasis added). 6 “A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a

significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Scrivener, 181

6 Our Supreme Court adopted the “substantial factor” test for proving discrimination cases under