Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)

Citation: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Parent Document: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10659980/housing-authority-v-cyr/ ↗

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limitation into statute); Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim
       Corp., 138 Conn. App. 826, 835, 54 A.3d 1040 (this court
       is constrained to read statute as written and may not
       read into clearly expressed legislation provisions that
       do not find expression in its words), cert. denied, 307
       Conn. 943, 56 A.3d 951 (2012).
          The trial court did not cite to any authority for its
       conclusion that, ‘‘if the acts upon which [the Kapa
       notice] is based occurred a year prior, the [Kapa] notice
       is improper.’’ In their respective briefs to this court, the
       parties have not provided us with any binding authority
       regarding this conclusion made by the trial court. We
       conclude, therefore, that the court improperly inserted
       a time requirement into § 47a-15 that is not contained
       in the statutory language. See, e.g., Housing Authority
       v. Martin, 95 Conn. App. 802, 813–14, 898 A.2d 245
       (§ 47a-15 requires only that landlord deliver Kapa
       notice and that notice state that breach is not remedia-
       ble; there is no statutory requirement that landlord fur-
       ther allege that continuing violation exists), cert.
       denied, 280 Conn. 904, 907 A.2d 90 (2006). Accordingly,
       we disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that
       such a requirement exists and that the Kapa notice in
       this case was invalid.
                                     B
          Next, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly
       concluded that the Kapa notice was invalid because it
       failed to refer to specific provisions of the lease or
       statutory sections that had been violated as a result of
       the conduct alleged in the notice. We agree and con-
       clude that, contrary to the arguments of the defendant,
       such specificity is not required pursuant to the statutory
       language or our case law.
         In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
       explained that, in a summary process case, the Kapa
       notice must be specific enough to allow the tenant to
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