Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)

Citation: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Parent Document: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10659980/housing-authority-v-cyr/ ↗

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or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental
          agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than
          fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach
          can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment of
          damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach
          is not so remedied within such fifteen-day period, the
          rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the
          breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of dam-
          ages and the tenant adequately remedies the breach
          within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement
          shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act
          or omission for which notice was given recurs within
          six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agree-
          ment in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-
          23 to 47a-23b, inclusive. . . .’’
             The text of § 47a-15 does not address the time frame
          in which a Kapa notice must be served on a tenant
          with respect to the alleged conduct that was the basis
          for the termination of the lease. ‘‘It is our duty to inter-
          pret statutes as they are written. . . . Courts cannot,
          by construction, read into statutes provisions which are
          not clearly stated. . . . The legislature is quite aware
          of how to use language when it wants to express its
          intent to qualify or limit the operation of a statute.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher,
          162 Conn. App. 145, 152, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert.
          denied, 321 Conn. 904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016); see Thomas
          v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 412,
          999 A.2d 682 (2010) (courts are not in business of writing
          statutes, as that is province of legislature, and role of
          courts is to interpret statutes as written); Glanz v. Com-
          missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 515, 524,
          270 A.3d 766 (2022) (intent of drafters of statutes
          derived from words used); see also State v. Obas, 320
          Conn. 426, 437–38, 130 A.3d 252 (2016) (Supreme Court
          rejected state’s argument that ignored absence of tem-
          poral limitation in statutory text and engrafted such
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