Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)

Citation: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Parent Document: Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10659980/housing-authority-v-cyr/ ↗

Full Text

2,456 chars

the notice. . . . [I]f substantially the same act or omis-
          sion for which notice was given recurs within six
          months, the landlord may terminate the rental agree-
          ment in accordance with the provisions of [§§] 47a-
          23 to 47a-23b, inclusive.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
          added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing
          Authority v. Rodriguez, 178 Conn. App. 120, 126–27,
          174 A.3d 844 (2017); see also Marrinan v. Hamer, 5
          Conn. App. 101, 104, 497 A.2d 67 (1985) (statute creates
          reconciliation period to allow errant tenants to remedy
          their first miscue). The Kapa notice has been described
          as a precondition to the right to serve a notice to quit.
          Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16
          Conn. App. 574, 593, 548 A.2d 744 (Borden, J., dis-
          senting), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432
          (1988); see also Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn.
          600, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993). Simply stated, a Kapa
          notice ‘‘must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the
          information the tenant needs to protect herself against
          premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . .
          To further this salutary purpose, the notice require-
          ments of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Har-
          ris, supra, 605; see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative
          v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728, 735, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010),
          cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
              Resolving whether the trial court properly deter-
          mined that a proper evaluation of a Kapa violation
          includes a consideration of whether the allegations
          were stale, we must engage in statutory interpretation.
          ‘‘[I]ssues of statutory interpretation constitute ques-
          tions of law over which the court’s review is plenary.
          The process of statutory interpretation involves the
          determination of the meaning of the statutory language
          as applied to the facts of the case, including the question
          of whether the language does so apply. . . . When con-
          struing a statute, [the court’s] fundamental objective is
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 13

Other Sections in This Document (68)

Full Text