Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf

(Mo. 2012). But, this does not answer the question of whether disallowing any

surety arrangement meets the constitutional guaranty to bail by sufficient sureties.

Focusing on the plain language of article I, section 20, and reviewing the historical

understanding of a surety at the time this language was adopted, we conclude the

better view is that a defendant must be allowed the option of a surety arrangement

in addition to the option of depositing cash or property in the registry of the court.

While this does not mean that a defendant has the right to actually make bail, article

I, section 20 guarantees the option of seeking to make bail via a surety, which

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 Statev. Barton
  (Peter
   
Richard), 89390-0     

involves a third-party promise and not merely the deposit of cash or equivalent

property with the court.

2. The trial court's October 18, 2012 order limited Barton's access to a surety
arrangement in violation of article I, section 20

Because Barton claims the trial court's October 18, 2012 order violated a

constitutional provision, our review is de novo. See State v. Jorgenson, 179 Wn.2d

145, 150, 312 P.3d 960 (2013); cf Banuelos, 91 Wn. App. at 861-62 (noting abuse

of discretion standard applied in review of the terms of a particular bail order). As

noted, the order here tracked the language of CrR 3.2(b)(4). CrR 3.2 as a whole

deals with the release of the accused. The rule first requires a presumption that the

accused will be released on his or her personal recognizance, unless the court

determines that the accused is unlikely to appear when required or that that he or she

poses a danger to the public or is likely to interfere with witnesses. CrR 3.2(a). If