Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
Source verification: official_capture_completeness_unverified
Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/893900.pdf ↗

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surety. In Burton v. Tomlinson, 19 Or. App. 247, 527 P.2d 123, 126 (1974), the

Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the "sufficient sureties" provision nowhere

says the "lawful release of a defendant may be accomplished only through the

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 Statev. Barton
 (Peter
   
Richard), 89390-0     

medium of sureties." The court reasoned that"[ w]ere this contention sound, release

of a defendant on his own recognizance or by any other means would be

constitutionally prohibited-an obvious absurdity." Id. We do not find this

persuasive. Personal recognizance does not contemplate the imposition of bail at

all. See CrR 3.2(a), (b) (if court concludes personal recognizance will not assure

defendant's presence, then it will set bail). There is no absurdity in concluding that

our constitution means that when bail is required, the accused may access it by

surety.

Still other courts have held that cash itself is a surety, i.e., a method available

to the defendant of securing release. Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1032 (reasoning that

"sufficient sureties" creates a right to access surety in some form, but that cash can

function as a surety). As explained above, a surety has consistently been defined

both historically and in modern times as a third-party promise to either incur a

financial burden or force performance. It has not been defined as the deposit of cash.

See Bralley, 70 Wn. App. at 653.

Finally, the State relies on State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003),

mostly for citations to historical background it claims supports its position. Br. of

Resp't at 6-7, 15, 18-19. But the recitation of the applicable history in Briggs is not