Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)

Citation: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Parent Document: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2020-09-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4784084/aljabban-v-fontana-indoor-swap-... ↗

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of a landlord for a tenant’s default in the payment of rent. [¶] (2) The repair
of damages to the premises, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, caused by
the tenant or by a guest or licensee of the tenant. [¶] (3) The cleaning of the
premises upon termination of the tenancy necessary to return the unit to the
same level of cleanliness it was in at the inception of the tenancy. . . . [¶]
(4) To remedy future defaults by the tenant in any obligation under the
rental agreement to restore, replace, or return personal property or
appurtenances, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, if the security deposit is
authorized to be applied thereto by the rental agreement.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1950.5, subd. (b).) The first three uses of the security deposit in Civil Code
section 1950.5, subdivision (b) (i.e., to cover defaulted rent, repairs to the
premises and cleaning the premises) are the same as the three uses identified
in Civil Code section 1950.7, subdivision (c). But the two statutes are
different in that Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (b) does not include
the proviso, which is present in Civil Code section 1950.7, subdivision (c),
that “the payment or deposit is made for any or all of those specific purposes.”
(Italics added.) Instead, Civil Code section 1950.5 simply provides that “[t]he
landlord may claim of the security only those amounts as are reasonably
necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision (b).” (Civ. Code, § 1950.5,
subd. (e).) “ ‘ “ ‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a
given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show that a different
intention existed.’ ” ’ ” (Williams v. County of San Joaquin (1990) 225
Cal.App.3d 1326, 1332-1333; see also 250 L.L.C. v. PhotoPoint Corp. (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 703, 718 (250 L.L.C.) [because the Legislature “expressly
prohibited waivers of section 1950.5’s protections for residential security
deposits . . . its failure to do so with respect to commercial security deposits

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