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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)

Citation
Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Parent Document
Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2020-09-10

Other Sections in This Document (85)

Full Text

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7     As the trial court understood plaintiffs’ claims, the existence of an
alleged agreement to renew the vendor’s permit as long as the rent was paid
was one of the theories in support of the causes of action for breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
                                        13
one year. The license agreements contain no language whatsoever reflecting
an obligation by FISM to automatically renew these agreements from year to
year. . . . [¶] The court does not find Ms. Carrasco[‘s] purported reliance on
some alleged oral representation regarding automatic license renewal to be
credible or reasonable in light of clear evidence through testimony of FISM
representatives that no such representations were ever made. This is further
corroborated by clear evidence that FISM had a custom and practice of yearly
re-renewal of license agreements for all its vendors. Nothing was automatic
so long as rent was paid. This evidence does not support Plaintiffs[‘] position
on this issue and the court so concludes.”
      The trial court then turned to the allegation that defendants wrongfully
prevented plaintiffs from removing the sink/cabinet unit, the water heater
and the decorative molding when vacating space H-2. As the trial court
explained, that allegation was relevant to plaintiffs’ causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
conversion. Citing a Civil Code provision concerning the circumstances
under which a tenant may remove affixed items, the trial court concluded
that “in the context of the landlord/tenant circumstance which this action
clearly is,” that provision of the Civil Code should be implied as a term of the
parties’ agreement. Applying the Civil Code provision and relevant case law,
the trial court described the applicable law: “[E]ven [if] . . . a particular item
may be moveable from real property, it does not mean it loses its character as
a trade fixture, and can still be considered ‘permanent’ for purposes of
identification as a trade fixture.” The court concluded,
             “It appears to the court, in the context of [paragraph] 4
         of the license agreement, that the water heater, sinks
         cabinets and molding may properly be characterized as
         trade fixtures, and were meant to remain where they were
         as long as the H-2 space was operated as a beauty salon.