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was only a subtenant, under the local ordinance, he was entitled to continue the occupancy in
the absence of good cause for eviction. (Id. at p. 35.) Affirming, the appellate court rejected
the claim that the ordinance was preempted by Costa-Hawkins, holding that while section
1954.53 is “seriously muddled,” “[t]aken together these provisions compel the conclusion that
an occupancy by a subtenant, ‘roommate,’ or other person occupying the premises ‘pursuant to
the rental agreement with the owner’ is treated as a continuation of the original occupancy,
even though the named ‘tenant’ under the rental agreement may have vacated.” (Id. at p. 41.)
However, the court declined to “decide whether a landlord may be barred from evicting a
subtenant, or other occupant, who has occupied the premises without the landlord’s agreement
or knowledge and who seeks to remain on the premises after the departure of all persons to
whose occupancy the landlord has consented.” (Id. at pp. 41-42.)
In Mosser, married tenants resided in a rent-controlled unit with their three children,
including their 13-year-old son. (Mosser, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 508-509.) Years later,
the tenants moved out of the apartment except for the son, then 23 years old. (Id. at p. 509.)
After the lessor served a notice purporting to double the rent, the rent control board deemed the
increase unlawful, reasoning that the son was a legal original occupant with his parents and was
entitled to rent control even after his parents vacated the apartment. (Id. at pp. 509-510.) The
trial court denied the lessor’s writ petition and adopted the rent control board’s interpretation of
the ordinance. (Id. at p. 510.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that rent decontrol under
Costa-Hawkins is triggered only when all original occupants vacate the premises. (Id. at p.
513.) Citing DeZerega, the court explained that “a person occupies the premises ‘pursuant to
the rental agreement with the owner’ [citation] if he or she does so with the owner’s
permission,” and that “[a] lawful occupancy of this nature ‘is treated as a continuation of the
original occupancy, even though the named “tenant” under the rental agreement may have
vacated.’” (Id. at p. 515.) Furthermore, “[t]he Legislature was presumably aware of San
Francisco’s ordinance, and its judicial construction [in Parkmerced], when adopting the Act,
yet expressed no intention to preempt the law.” (Id. at p. 514.)