Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles etc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026)

Citation: Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles etc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026)
Parent Document: Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles etc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2026-05-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10859038/apartment-assn-of-los-angeles-... ↗

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goals of the Relocation Assistance Ordinance are], state law
provides for a different purpose. (See Coyne, supra,
9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231 [‘A property owner’s lawful decision to
withdraw from the rental market [under the Ellis Act] may not
be frustrated by burdensome monetary exactions from the owners
to fund the City’s policy goals.’].) Because its effect is to frustrate
the purpose of the Costa-Hawkins Act, [the Relocation Assistance
Ordinance] is preempted.” (Pasadena, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at
p. 236; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 172 [local regulation cannot frustrate
purpose of state law]; accord, Great Western Shows v. County of
Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 868; AIDS Healthcare
Foundation, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 88.)
       The City and Intervenors concede the Relocation Assistance
Ordinance conflicts with the Costa-Hawkins Act under the
reasoning of Pasadena. Intervenors argue Pasadena was
incorrectly decided because it did not apply the preemption
standard articulated in Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at page 743,
that “[t]he ‘contradictory and inimical form of preemption does
not apply unless the ordinance directly requires what the state
statute forbids or prohibits what the state enactment demands.’ ”
       This argument does not account for the California Supreme
Court’s subsequent determination that Riverside’s
demands/prohibits language “ ‘should not be misunderstood to
improperly limit the scope of the preemption inquiry.’ ” (Chevron,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 148, quoting Riverside, at p. 763 (conc.
opn. of Liu, J.).) The high court, adopting language from Justice
Liu’s concurring opinion in Riverside, stated that “ ‘state law may
preempt local law when local law prohibits not only what a state
statute “demands” but also what the statute permits or

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